Introduction
Central to Jeremy Bentham's writings on guardianship are discrete sections on Guardian and Ward and Parent and Child. 1 The present writer's appraisal of Bentham's views on guardianship 2 drew heavily on these and other of his major works 3 to identify the characteristics of guardian-ward relations as Bentham perceived them. The resulting profile, judged to be Bentham's legacy in this sphere, forms the key reference for the present work. This paper seeks to address a subject not covered in the previous study namely the relationship between Bentham's views on guardianship and on parentoffspring relations. It reviews those aspects of Bentham's account that suggest a connection or connections between the two sets of relations as against others that shed doubt on whether such connection(s) exist.
A commentator on contemporary child law has claimed that the Children Act (1989) clarified the distinction between guardians and parents once and for all. This legislation '[...] rendered the concepts of parenthood and guardianship legally distinct: parents are no longer regarded as guardians and, apart from exceptional cases [...] no guardian will be parents (sic)'. 4 The present paper argues, firstly, that it is questionable whether parenthood and guardianship have ever been purely legal concepts; and, secondly, that despite overlaps and some similarities, the distinction between guardianship and parenthood is (and historically has always been) fundamental, both at a conceptual and at confers inalienable parental status. 13 The biological reality of progeny stays with the parties responsible; it cannot transfer to others and the parental relation only ceases on first death of either party.
14 Most of what follows from the biological facts, ranging from immediate 'survival care' of the infant to providing a physical, emotional and intellectually caring relationship into adulthood and beyond, are social (and a few legal)
expectations of parents that vary in acceptable quantity and quality historically and between cultures. A terminological distinction between biological (blood tied) parenting and functional parenting may suffice to convey this for present purposes.
By contrast, and with an apparent exception to be discussed, becoming a guardian does not stem from biological qualification: neither status nor function depend on the existence of a blood tie between guardian and ward. Most usually, being a guardian means 'voluntarily' 15 assuming particular responsibilities towards another person determined by that other person's need for protection and representation. The assumption of responsibilities is via a relation that is sanctioned legally, ethically and socially;
guardians' status derives from this, not from 'nature' or natural contingency. The guardian's responsibilities cease when the need is met or if, for whatever reason, it is necessary for another person to assume the guardianship mantle in his/her place. Thus responsibility within guardianship is transferable in this sense.
The exception to these distinct criteria is a category designation termed 'parental guardianship' that, in brief, is taken to embody Bentham's contention that parents are guardians of their own offspring. This he maintained alongside the assertion that parents were their offspring's 'masters', i.e. their employers, viz.: the father is '[...] in certain respects the master of his child and in others the guardian'. 16 An initial response to the idea that parents are both guardians and masters might be to ask whether this was perhaps an overstated rendition of the truism that parents have both responsibilities and rights vis- 14 This does not, of course, invalidate personal experience confirming that our parents remain our parents psychologically and emotionally after they die. 15 Bentham gives few clues as to how guardians were appointed, but we may presume that whatever legal or social processes were entailed did not involve coercion or routine conscription.
à-vis their offspring. That Bentham clearly sought to convey more than this is shown by the way in which he counter-balanced parents' responsibilities with rights embodied in the role of master. The rationale for this assertion no doubt stemmed from the fact that he was advancing his argument in a socio-economic climate in which parents needed to gain income from their offspring's labour.
Under such conditions, it is particularly noteworthy that Bentham saw it as essential to affirm that being a master did not necessarily detract from parents being their offspring's guardians, even if in so doing he added fuel to an ongoing and still unresolved debate about the balance of rights and responsibilities of parents. The import of
Bentham's contention for present purposes is that it calls for two additional appraisals: of parents as masters; and of parents' capacity to deal with competing demands (see Parents as Masters and Competing Demands on Parents). Fortunately it was found that these additional appraisals did not divert focus from the main question to be addressed, namely whether Bentham's contention that parents are their offspring's guardians clarifies or obscures the distinctions or connections between parents and guardians.
Bases for Comparing Relations
The approach to comparing the key sets of relations adopted in this paper differs in two main ways from the more common pattern. Firstly, it departs from the approach exemplified by Blackstone whose thinking was based on the notion that guardian-ward relations are 'plainly derived' from those of parent-child, 17 a view he advanced without clarification or evidential support. Modern versions of this basis for comparison can be found in the idea of a 'parental model' of guardianship, i.e. implying that guardian-ward relations are or should be 'modelled on' ideal standards and attributes supposedly upheld by parents. 18 Arguably, Bentham's innovative vision of relations within guardianship did not need to draw upon an analogy with parent-child relations even had he thought it appropriate.
The second way the present work departs from most discussions of these relations, including that of Blackstone, is that it focuses on parent-offspring relations, thereby including 'adult children'. The term 'offspring' is the preferred alternative to Bentham's 'filiality', 19 which was intended to convey the same meaning. Burns' understanding of Bentham's position was 'that the duration of parental authority is not to be defined absolutely by the [limited period over which children are relatively powerless] and that the relationship may be prolonged into adult life […]'. 20 The departure from exclusive attention to youngsters that this perspective affords serves two purposes. It underlines that parental relations are not confined within arguably artificial age-related limits. Secondly, it provides a 'level playing field' upon which to make the comparison with guardianship.
As indicated in The Profile, the term 'guardian-ward relations' is generic in being applicable both to youngsters and to mentally disordered persons of any age. Bentham's attitude to age-related termination of guardianship for youngsters is discussed later (see particularly Guardians and Parents Compared -Purpose and Duration).
Methodological Implications
The approach to evaluation in this article was conditioned by the fact that Bentham did not set out to provide factual evidence in support of his contentions. Likewise, this paper makes no attempt to ascertain what evidence was available to him nor to review or update the factual basis of his views. We know neither how effective guardians were in fulfilling their obligations to wards nor of parents in fulfilling obligations to their offspring.
Bentham might well have qualified the assertion that guardians' powers were for the benefit of their wards 21 by adding that he was not making an unsubstantiated generalisation about the behaviour of guardians, but was expressing confidence in how the right principles and ethical standards implicit in guardianship applied in practice. The aforementioned review 22 found that overall this contention appeared justified on the basis of reasonable expectation.
Regarding parents' effectiveness, as parents or as guardians, Bentham's awareness of the socio-economic conditions that impinged on families would no doubt have caused him to reflect on those that would affect their relationship with individual offspring. We are nevertheless left to conjecture about the impact on these relations of major differences in family circumstances: levels of income; class and social conditions; roles of mothers and fathers; and variations in family size. However, Bentham did recognise the cost of parenting and that parents had the right to be given 'an indemnity for the trouble and expense of the education of their children'.
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Parents as Masters
Because of the way Bentham assigned the dual role to parents it was judged a necessary
preliminary to establish what Bentham meant by saying that parents were their offspring's 'masters', i.e. that their offspring were their servants. What seemed initially to be an unwarranted digression from the main body of the study revealed some interesting issues and common factors within the relations considered.
In maintaining that the power of parents qua masters over offspring qua servants served the interests of the former, Bentham was in tune with contemporary master-servant law that, unlike its modern counterpart, employer-employee law, gave almost unlimited rights to masters. If, as has already been suggested, Bentham ascribed the role of masters to parents because of prevailing social conditions and economic pressures on families, it appears contradictory to maintain that parents could put their offspring's interests before their own (as masters). This issue is taken forward later where Bentham's claim that parents can 'reconcile' these conflicting demands is discussed. Meanwhile it is noted that Bentham did not disregard masters' responsibility towards servants' welfare. He advocated masters providing 'guardianship-type' care for apprentices 24 and conceded that it would be within the scope of the law to impose obligations on masters, namely 'that of affording maintenance, or giving wages'. 25 Presumably Bentham thought such concessions were insufficient to affect the balance of interests in favour of servants and would have perceived it as an unacceptable part of a master's 'burthen' to assume responsibility for servants' personal, social or circumstantial vulnerabilities.
Before leaving the contentious issue of the connection between master-servant relations and parenting, reference is made to a different view of master-servant relations,
i.e. one that questions historically whether these did in fact always give preference to masters' interests. Goodin analysed how master-servant law was actually implemented during the period in question and found that Courts looked much more to the vulnerability of servants and their dependence on masters to reduce or remove causes of harmful or potentially harmful dangers than was popularly portrayed.
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On the strength of these findings, Goodin subjected masters' responsibility for the vulnerability of servants to further scrutiny. He discounted 'voluntary' and 'self assumed'
positions, e.g. that servants 'choose' their conditions of employment and that masters may benignly and perhaps arbitrarily decide to better them, as well as the more formal obligations derived from the laws of contract or tort. Instead he favoured a much broader formula, arguing that responsibility for servants' vulnerability to threatened harms, i.e. to their welfare or interests, 27 rests with whoever is in a position to discharge it. In other words, vulnerability is the key concept and is relational in character in two respects: in addition to a person's situational or circumstantial vulnerability is his/her vulnerability towards a party or parties in a position to affect the situation one way or another.
Goodin's arguments concerning overall obligations towards vulnerable persons are referred to again in the Summary and Conclusions. The following comments therefore look only at the logistical and ethical applications of Goodin's theses to the matter in hand. The impact of his argument suggests that the additional designation 'masters' does not itself provide parents with a valid claim to have interests divergent from those of their offspring. This is because their actual presence and proximity identifies them as the parties with de facto responsibility to confront the vulnerability of their offspring-servants -both as to any hazards involved in the assigned tasks and in being dependent on them to set reasonable quantifiable and quality standards. This further suggests that some safeguards would or should be in place to ensure that the relation served the interests of both parties, in which case his verdict departs from Bentham's position to this extent.
Competing Demands on Parents
An uncontentious argument pursued in this paper is that parents fulfil different roles, and that these compete to varying degrees with parents' own interests as well as with those of offspring. Because parents inevitably experience conflict in satisfying their own needs as against those of offspring, Bentham was assuredly right that parents' capacity to deal with conflicting demands is at the very heart of parenting. If the sources of tension were not directly related to the demands on parents that Bentham described, or if the divergence between them was less sharply defined than he conveyed, the basis of his standpoint is judged to be at least as valid as other contenders and deserves to be treated seriously.
In maintaining that parents fulfil two quite different roles, those of guardians and of masters, the prima facie implication is that these impose competing demands on parents to pursue different interests. This is confirmed by Bentham's treatment of divergent interests as pursued by guardians and masters in their respective relations. Master-servant relations are primarily for the gain of masters exercising power beneficial to their own interests. In guardian-ward relations, on the other hand, wards are the primary benefit gainers; guardians exercise a fiduciary power that gives priority to serving their interests.
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The critically important argument that Bentham pursued in applying these considerations to parents is that, despite their dual role, parents can give preference to the interests of their offspring. In other words, Bentham is claiming that rather than masterservant and guardian-ward relations persistently running counter to each other, parents are able to prioritise their responsibilities in the interests of their offspring. Parents' 'natural affection' for their offspring enables them to 'easily reconcile' the conflicting demands; a father's natural affection for his offspring 'leads him rather to make sacrifices for his children than to make use of his rights for his own advantage'. discussion, sensed that the reality was a good deal more complex than feelings of natural affection.
At the opposite extreme to manifestations of natural affection, there is evidence that mothers' disposition towards their babies can be one of hatred. 34 If, on the other hand, it was the 'endowment' meaning of 'natural' that Bentham had in mind, this translates as a view that parents' propensity to afford their offspring affection is instinctive or in-built, part of the inherent make-up of being a parent. A concomitant of this view is that it is the biological facts of parenting that 'kick-starts' and sustains the bonding process. 
Parental Guardianship
Bentham's argument that parents are the guardians of their offspring is problematic because although his initial focus on guardianship in the family context suggests an overlap in status and function between parent-offspring and guardian-ward relations, he did not substantiate the connection. We cannot therefore be sure whether he was considering two different species (the basic assumption in this article being that this was the case) or a single species in which the two are the same relation under a different title.
Both possibilities as meanings of 'parental guardianship' are considered.
The latter possibility implies that when persons become parents they simultaneous become their offspring's guardians, so rendering the two titles interchangeable. This seems to be the legal presumption, discussed below. A quite different implication relates to assumptions apropos functions, i.e. that these 'parental guardians' 37 would perform the same functions as guardians. Examining the latter assumption takes the form of comparisons between parents and guardians in the following section.
37 IPML (CW), p. 276
The legal basis for the idea that the status of guardian and that of parent are interchangeable requires brief reference to guardianship law history for which the 1985
Law Commission study of Guardianship 38 is used as a benchmark. The Commissioners looked to the origin of guardianship law within the feudal system of land tenure and to different forms of guardianship linked to the property of the child heir and land holdings.
They then reviewed thirteen of these old or obsolete guardianship laws, some of which to one or both of these laws, the Commission's term ('natural or parental' guardianship)
is henceforth adopted.
It is difficult to offer a balanced appraisal of 'natural or parental' guardianships, both because of their feudal resonance and because of the manner in which they are described in the literature. Nevertheless, without underestimating their importance for particular historical purposes, their credentials in terms of the concept of guardianship discussed in this paper raise serious doubts. A tentative assessment is that the legal designations were purely titular, bound up with feudal concepts of entitlements to property and to inheritance, and were discriminatory on grounds of gender, age and legitimacy that now seem inappropriate by any criteria. should be chosen, who will voluntarily discharge this office; or some public officer should be appointed for this purpose. An alternative possibility apropos the second set of the illustrations, and perhaps more likely, is that they demonstrate parental guardianship extending and being shared across generations. Although this again indicates that natural/parental guardianship could be held concurrently by persons other than the biological parents a liberal interpretation of the 'blood tie' as a credential shared by the whole of the family may be the rationale.
It is nevertheless maintained that both sets of illustrations imply acceptance of other parties becoming the offspring's guardians in place of the parents. Taken overall, they portray parents' guardianship to be transferable rather than being anchored to the 
Purpose and Duration
Although we have no single statement from Bentham on the overall purpose of guardianship his account clearly conveys that the institution was not only intended to increase the happiness of wards but to thereby benefit society as a whole. At the risk of imposing a modern perspective, we may further infer that guardianship was regarded as 57 Ibid.
the most effective and humane way to ensure proper care and, where possible, to help achieve personal fulfilment for society's most vulnerable members. More specific objectives that would contribute to this goal can be deduced from descriptions of the situation of putative wards and the rationale Bentham gave for the duration or timespan over which individual guardianships were expected to last.
Because wards -certain youngsters and mentally disordered persons -are 'deficient' in knowledge, motivation or physical capability, the role of guardians is to provide them with the necessary protection and 'government' (representation) in order for them to become happier, more independent and fulfilled persons. Guardians are empowered to exercise proxy autonomy on behalf of a person not capable of choice until that other person reaches independence where such a goal is achievable.
Attainment of personal autonomy is a cherished human aspiration and may be expressed as a basic need 59 or as a right. Hart asserts that 'the only natural right' is that of 'the equal right of all men to be free', only enjoyed by those 'capable of choice' apropos their freedom from unwarranted coercive actions or restraints by others. 60 Arguably, those not capable of choice also aspire to and have a claim to autonomy; having another to exercise choice on their behalf and protecting them from such hazards is a good 'second best' (albeit a hopefully short-term) alternative.
The functions of the institution of guardianship in facilitating realisation of these goals can be said to be twofold: to replace whatever conditions or arrangements (including unsatisfactory parental relations) that had hitherto failed to protect and represent these groups of vulnerable persons; or to make appropriate arrangements where none previously existed. This is the rationale and logistical basis upon which guardians would be expected to intervene, to engage with wards, to initiate and pursue a relationship with them. In comparing the manner of closure of these sets of relations, the above has described the situation in which parent-offspring relations cease at the first death of either party. When a parent dies this may well leave an offspring' needs unmet. Again by way of contrast, in a situation in which a death or other exigency precipitately curtailed a guardians' engagement in a formal guardian-ward relationship, a replacement guardian would be required 64 -provided of course that the need for guardianship was unchanged.
Protection and Trust
Bentham claimed that security was the most important of the subordinate ends of the law, and that its maintenance had primacy over the other ends, namely subsistence, abundance, and equality. 65 He particularly stressed the need to protect young children 66 It could be maintained that satisfactory parent-child relating depends on the child being able to trust his/her parents and that trust can only form from good parenting experience, more fully discussed under Competing Demands on Parents. Protection against vulnerability and avoidance of inappropriate over-protection would be part of this.
These taken together are bases for the trust assumption, but it is questionable whether such an assumption is justified apropos parent-offspring relations.
At first sight, the divide between protection of person and protection of property seems less apposite to the parental role, but closer scrutiny in the more obvious context of adult children questions this. The way parents attend to their own affairs so as to be able to provide for their offspring when they die has become a major issue. Again, the question raised is how reliable and efficient parents are in attending to the future needs and financial security of offspring.
Researchers have shed light on parent's consistency or otherwise in providing offspring with protection, reporting divergent attitudes as between 'conservative' and 'radical' parental dispositions. The findings revealed that the conservative parent was protective in seeking to prevent the child entering dangerous situations but tended to be controlling and to stifle initiative. The radical parent encourages the child to experiment, 72 Ibid., i. p. 347 thereby possibly involving risk, and to develop new skills by engendering enthusiasm and confidence, but tends to lull both parties into a falsely egalitarian stance.
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Agency and Representation
A clear presumption present throughout Bentham's account is that the institution of guardianship vested guardians with authority, and that this empowered them to represent persons unable to act or decide in their own interests so as to be able to effectively advocate on wards' behalf. This was described in The Profile as the agency basis of guardian-ward relations. If Bentham tacitly accepted the convention that this authority resided in the Crown as 'Guardian of Guardians', he made no direct reference to this.
However, we know that Bentham as a law reformer was uncomfortable with what he may well have perceived as 'fictions' of this kind and therefore looked instead to the more direct and practical alternative of applying agency law tenets.
Had Bentham pursued this way forward he would firstly have had to confront the limitations of agency law, at that time poorly developed, 74 its main restriction being that it could only provide guardians with the necessary authority if principals (wards) themselves gave guardians that authority; principals incapable of providing such authorisation required authority to come from elsewhere. The alternative to invoking the Royal Prerogative that Bentham may have favoured was to extend agency law tenets to empower guardians to act without authority from wards on a substituted judgement basis.
Agency law principles were the starting point for the Law Commission's discussion of the position of the 'incapacitated principal'.
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The status and function of parents as their offspring's representatives has been questioned, 76 as indeed has the whole basis of parental authority following the precedent set by the Gillick case. 77 Whilst they lack status as legally authorised advocates, it is commonly accepted that parents generally strive to represent their youngster's interests and that this parental function reduces over time as the need diminishes. also generally acknowledged that parents have their own legitimate agendas to pursue that may conflict with those of offspring; moreover these may become particularly acute and critical over representation issues. Overall, It could be concluded that the parent-offspring relation provides no assurance that parents consistently or reliably speak or act in their offspring's best interests.
The Power Dimension
Powers of guardians derived from trusteeship (mandatory responsibilities) and agency law (as authorised representatives) have been mentioned already, and the effect of fiduciary obligations upon guardians in enhancing their powers is discussed in the following section. However, Bentham seems to have been less concerned with guardians' legal powers per se than that guardians exercised such powers that they possessed to benefit wards, and appeared confident that this was generally the case. 78 As between two recognised kinds of power relation 79 as applied to guardian and ward, it seems that
Bentham was predominantly considering 'power over' (imposed power) but also envisaged there being a relation that gave 'power to' wards (i.e. by empowerment). 80 The relevance of this key distinction in the nature of power relations cannot be properly assessed given the absence of a dynamic element in Bentham's account that would enable us to follow shifts in 'the balance of power' over time. This is necessary to indicate how the nature of the power might change (in either direction) over the course of the guardianship. Such changes would depend on whether compulsion was needed and on the ward's increasing or decreasing capacity to function without exercise of guardians' power(s).
One specific kind of 'power over' has already been covered in the section on agency and would apply where the agent is authorised to override the principal's expressed wishes. This is lawfully and ethically allowable when the agent acts properly in assessing that the decision or proposed action will best serve the principal's interests. The parallel with actions and decisions of guardians is easily recognisable.
78 IPML (CW) p. 266. 79 S. Lucas, Power, London, 1974, pp. 28-31. 80 Cox, 'Bentham's Guardianship', p. 17.
The particular 'imposition' on parents of common law guardianship, discussed above, remains an enigma in terms of specific requirements as does the general question of the nature and extent of legal powers of parents, notwithstanding the readily recognisable power difference between parents and their offspring as an aspect of normal family life. It seems safe to say, however, that the distinction between parents' power(s) and guardians' power(s) is that the former may well be exercised variably and possibly inconsistently so far as the needs of offspring are concerned. Inevitably, we think of parents' use of power as being at least to some extent for their own benefit rather than for that of offspring.
The Fiduciary Dimension
The single statement from Bentham linking guardianship with fiduciary relations -that a guardian's 'power... thereby coupled with a trust, may be termed a fiduciary one' 81 -does not convey its importance. It is perhaps surprising therefore that he did not discuss the fiduciary concept per se: its original connection with Chancery and Equity; its meaning in ethical or legal terms; or its particular application to guardian-ward relations.
Nevertheless he would probably have endorsed the following explanation of fiduciary relations, it being of general application and not framed within its more usual modern commercial context. This explanation stresses the inequality of the relation, the dominant position of the fiduciary, the reliance of the 'entrustor' 82 on the fiduciary and the fiduciary's recognition of this reliance. The entrustor reposes trust, confidence and loyalty on the fiduciary and this reliance or dependence renders him/her vulnerable to the fiduciary. 83 An alternative to Sheppard's term, 'Reliance Theory', that better conveys the thinking underlying this formulation is 'Reliance-Dependency-Vulnerability Theory'.
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The main thrust of Bentham's exposition clearly showed the guardian-ward relation as essentially fiduciary. Of special interest from among commentators whose premise is that parentoffspring relations are not fiduciary (at least under prevailing USA law) is a work that explores the feasibility and benefit of attempting to 'apply a fiduciary framework to the parent-child relationship'. This enterprise, the authors admit, 'requires accommodation of some peculiar features that distinguish this relationship from many others in the fiduciary category'. They go on to explain that the task would necessitate 'legal regulation to encourage the parent to act so as to serve the interest of the child rather than her conflicting interests'; therefore 'bonding' patterns would need to be strengthened, with progress towards achieving this verified by additional 'monitoring' from child care agencies.
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On balance, the argument advanced in this paper is that, in contrast to guardian- origin of the relation showed that it was founded on and regulated by 'natural law'.
Interestingly, given variable interest in natural law theory and its relevance over recent years, the above-mentioned study 91 provides an update discussion of the notion that parental rights originate in natural law.
Quality Control, Accountability and Responsibility
We may be certain that Bentham would have been concerned to maintain the credibility, 
Summary and Conclusions
The key reference point throughout this article has been the profile of guardian-ward Mention has been made of Goodin's thesis, the main thrust of which is to challenge the underlying rationale of specifically defined special relations, including those of parent-offspring, guardian-ward and master-servant. In assessing where responsibility lies towards vulnerable persons he asks: 'who is actually in a position to remedy or change the harmful situation to which the person is vulnerable?' Obtaining a reply should identify the person(s) with de facto ability to change the situation and it is he/she/them who are responsible. This article does not question the notion of de facto responsibility or its ethical implications but maintains that special relations and duties are the socially essential basis upon which to ascertain where responsibility lies, i.e. to enable us to judge who should be making sure they are in a position to alleviate the effects of vulnerability.
This provides a much firmer ethical stance upon which to form judgements, but also takes the pragmatic aspect of the discussion a step further into consideration of appropriate skills and experience of the persons identified as well as their actual presence.
Goodin's argument nevertheless provides a useful basis for comparing the principle relations considered in this paper. Parents, guardians and masters (employers) share a common kind of responsibility towards their respective 'charges', being the designated parties ostensibly able to combat their vulnerability and to recognise these persons' vulnerability towards them. Their responsibilities transcend self-assumed or voluntary positions, specific legal obligations or the general 'duty of care', the real tests being pragmatic and logistical: 'can these parties actually protect their charges?' The implications of Bentham's account of guardian and ward is that it exemplifies a 'special' relation entailing responsibility to fulfil 'special duties' towards certain vulnerable persons, and, most importantly, maintains that designated 'guardians' are the right persons actually in position to fulfil the task. Conversely, serious doubts have been shown to stand in the way of regarding 'parents' in the same light.
An interesting question for further research would be to enquire as to the connection between fiduciary relations and designated 'special' relations. As applied to parentoffspring relations, particularly due for review is the notion that appropriate responses to the needs and vulnerability of youngsters need not come from blood tied parents and can be met by substitute parents (related or otherwise) whose main qualification is that they are logistically and otherwise in a close enough position to meet the need. An alternative view -that society expects blood tied parents to ensure that they are prepared in both senses to respond appropriately, rather than depending on others to take their placewould also need to be considered.
The current conception of guardianship arguably suffers from loss of the coherence that is conveyed in The Profile, the distillation of 'Bentham's Guardianship' offered in this article. This incoherence may be due such factors as: the splitting of guardianship law between children and narrowly defined groups of adults; the divisive effect of confining application to persons with mental disorder to within a separate statutory framework; and the absorption of protective functions within social policy agendas and legislative provision. Guardianship's key representational function has arguably been submerged by these developments but is now regaining prominence. This is revealed in response to the need for added safeguards for 'at risk' groups such as elderly mentally infirm persons in residential care. 93 Perspectives on the parent-child nexus have shifted from focussing on parental rights (and latterly parents' obligations) towards giving prominence to protecting children's welfare and interests, but in so doing have tended to polarise these positions rather than attending to relations between them. 94 Also, contemporary practice in the area of personal protection has been provided discretely vis-à-vis children and adults since English local authority social services departments were split into separate agencies with distinct 'client' responsibilities. Retaining family orientation may not have been sufficient to prevent the tragedies that have occurred due to neglect or abuse of offspring but would at least have better enabled parental relations to remain the key focus for effective intervention.
A fresh look at Bentham's portrayal suggests a number of ways forward -legally, socially and ethically -that would harness the services of a defined group of persons, i.e.
guardians, appropriately motivated and skilled, to provide protection and representation for particularly needful groups of people through a special kind of relationship. Persons in this latter category are otherwise likely to remain socially vulnerable instead of being enabled to live effectively within society. In short, Bentham's validation of guardianship and its purpose is as relevant to-day as it was in his own time.
